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Abstract:
We present an information based model of leadership in a setting that exhibits the familiar
problems of free riding and coordination failure. Leaders have superior information about the
value of the project in hand and can send a costly signal to their uninformed followers to
persuade them to cooperate in the project. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow
the better informed leader. We provide experimental evidence that, when the leaders’ gender is
revealed to their followers, female subjects hesitate to lead (send a costly signal) while
followers’ behavior does not indicate any gender discrimination. Such behavior is not observed
among the male leaders.
Keywords: Leadership, Information, Gender, Free Riding, Coordination Problem.
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Introduction
There is considerable experimental evidence indicating that the behavior of men and
women differs in a variety of issues such as risk aversion (e.g. Byrness, Miller, and Schafer,
1999), altruism (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), and competition (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle,
and Rusticchini, 2003). Our experimental study contributes to this literature by focusing on
leadership.
Today women are capable and active in the society but have failed to attain leadership
positions consistent with their representation. While discrimination maybe one explanation of
this shortfall, it does not explain it all. If women believe that they are less likely to be followed
than men, they may refuse to accept leadership roles that are often costly for the leaders.
We present a single-shot, collective action game in which free riding and coordination
failures can prevent group cooperation. In our setting, leaders, informed about the value of the
project in hand, have the incentive to persuade group cooperation by sending a costly signal to
their followers indicating that cooperation is worthwhile. We observe no gender discrimination
by the followers but find evidence that female subjects are significantly more eager to lead in
anonymous environments, where their gender is not known to their followers, than they are in
environments where their gender is known to their followers. Such a pattern is not observed
among the male subjects.

Experiment
The experimental design is based on a theoretical model by Komai and Stegeman (2006)
and Komai, et al (2007). An experimental session consists of 5 groups of 3 playing ten rounds of
a single-shot, collective action game. Subjects begin each round with $10 endowments and

decide whether or not to invest their endowments in a group project. In each round three possible
payoff scenarios are assigned to each group with equal probability (Table 1).
Table 1
Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Investors
(each)

Non-investors
(Each)

Investors
(each)

Non-investors
(Each)

Investors
(each)

Non- investors
(Each)

All invest

20

_

13

_

0

_

2 invest

13

17

9

15

0

8

1 invests

7

14

5

12

0

9

Nobody
Invests

-

10

-

10

-

10

Scenarios vary across groups and change each round. In Scenarios 1 and 2, well-being is
maximized if all players fully cooperate. Participation in Scenario 3 is bad for the group and
individual group members. No player is willing to participate by himself in any scenario. There
are increasing returns to participation in Scenarios 1 and 2. In Scenario 2 free riding is strictly
dominant. In Scenario 1 players prefer to participate if they believe that the other two group
members will participate. In Scenario 2, strict dominance of the free riding strategy, and in
Scenario 1, failure of coordination can prevent efficient group cooperation.1
Each group has a leader who is aware of the assigned scenario. The others two members
of the group (the followers) know only the possible scenarios and their likelihood. The leader
moves first, deciding whether or not to invest. Followers observe their leader’s decision before
they simultaneously and separately make theirs. The leader has the incentive to invest in
Scenarios 1 and 2 (to send a positive signal to his followers) and followers have the incentive to
1

Under complete information.

follow the leader because the leader has more information about what they should do than they
themselves have.2
We use a random rematching design: group composition and the leader-follower roles
change each round. This rematching procedure was introduced by Andreoni (1988) in public
good experiments to balance the desire to test a single-shot prediction with the need for repeated
experience by the subjects.
What activities can represent our game? One example (Franzen 1995) is signing a
petition or donating money for some common good. Both activities are costly. A typical person
has no incentive to participate alone. More participation helps the cause. Potential participants
have the incentive to free ride.3 The game is a single-shot game because players may not get
exposed to the same project or may not be with the same people again. Our model is also
appropriate for taskforces (temporary units, or ad hoc committees established to work on a
single-shot collective activity).
Subjects’ earnings are privately announced after each round using identification numbers.
Subjects are told that only one, randomly chosen round determines their final earnings and thus
they should always make their best decision.
Two treatments were designed:
•

Gender Signaling Treatment (GST): Leaders’ gender is revealed to their followers
(followers’ decision sheets indicate whether the leader was male or female).4

2

A precise characterization of the equilibrium is available upon request.
However, if the project is highly valued (Scenario 1) and if a large number of players participate, participating
may become more appealing than not because participants may not only gain from the success of the project but also
may enjoy a positive political status or a sense of pride for being a participant.
4
In the real world, potential followers are aware of their leaders’ gender: in some contexts (like in politics) the
gender of female leaders is explicitly talked about. To start, we choose the extreme manipulation of directly
revealing the leader’s gender rather than the more subtle manipulation of using he or she terminology. If we were
unable to find a difference in behavior using our manipulation, differences are unlikely to be observed under more
subtle manipulations.
3

•

Gender Anonymous Treatment (GAT): followers are unaware of their leader’s
gender.

Our null hypothesis is that the same pattern of behavior should be observed in both
treatments since the leaders’ gender is irrelevant to their information signaling role.
Four sessions of each treatment were conducted. In each session we attempted to have 8
subjects of one sex and seven of the other, or as close to this split as possible.5 Subjects are
recruited by e-mail and posters. Instructions are read aloud and subjects are tested to make sure
they understand them.6 Decisions were anonymous; subjects were identified by random 5-digit
identification numbers. Sessions lasted about 70 minutes. Average earning was $12.10 in the
GST and $12.29 in the GAT (no showup fee). Subjects’ socioeconomic characteristics did not
differ significantly across treatments.

Results and Discussion
To analyze followers’ behavior, we combined all three scenarios.7 A total of 400
decisions were made by followers in each treatment. We conducted random effect Probit
regressions estimating followers’ probability of investment in both the GAT and the GST (see
Table 2). We found a positive and significant correlation between followers’ investment
decisions and their leader’s decision to invest in both treatments, but no significant relationship
between the followers’ decisions, their own gender, or their leader’s gender.8

5

No session had more than 9 of one sex.
In a post-experiment survey subjects were asked about how clear the instructions were (1= unclear … 5 = very
clear); 60% responded 5 and the rest 4.
7
Because followers are uninformed about the assigned scenario (the only source of information for the followers is
the decision made by their leader).
8
The following variables were jointly insignificant: subjects’ major, GPA, and clarity of the instructions.
6

Followers might have ignored the leaders’ gender thinking that gender is irrelevant to the
leaders’ signal or might have acted out of political correctness thinking this is what is expected
of them. We cannot completely dismiss the latter, but are inclined to discount it because
decisions are anonymous and financially motivated (non-self-serving decisions are costly).
Table 2: Random Effects Probit Results-Followers’ Decision to Invest
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Marginal value
Variable
Constant
Leader Invested

GAT
-1.178*
(5.09)
1.900*
(11.99)
0.736

Female Leader

Female Follower

0.101
(0.42)
0.039

Leader Invested × Female
Leader ×Female Follower
Leader Invested × Female
Leader × Male Follower
Leader Invested × Male
Leader × Female Follower
Round
Rho
L.L.F.

-0.029
(0.99)
-0.011
0.244*
(2.49)
-181.5

GST
-1.215*
(3.78)
1.856*
(5.51)
0.671
-0.070
(0.26)
-0.026
-0.368
(0.10)
-0.013
0.408
(0.83)
0.147
0.212
(0.51)
0.077
0.006
(0.01)
0.002
-0.039
(1.28)
-0.014
0.210*
(1.98)
-173.9

To analyze leaders’ behavior we consider each scenario separately.9 Leaders made 133
decisions in Scenario 3 (both treatments combined) and, except for 1 leader, nobody invested. In
Scenario 1, leaders made a total of 127 decisions. In every instance but 8, leaders invested
regardless of their gender or the treatment.

9

Because leaders are aware of the assigned scenario.

The interesting scenario is Scenario 2 in which leaders made 140 decisions (both
treatments combined). 10 A preliminary data analysis suggested that while the male leaders’
investment decision was not affected by the treatment, female leaders invested significantly less
in the GST than they did in the GAT. We conducted Probit regressions estimating leaders’
probability of investment in scenario 2 (see Table 3).11
The regression results show that the GST has a negative and significant effect on the
investment decision of female leaders: when the leaders’ gender is known, female leaders
hesitate to lead (send a costly signal). Male leaders follow the same behavioral pattern regardless
of the treatment and the pattern is insignificantly different from that of female leaders in the
GAT.12
Table 3: Probit Results: Leaders’ Decision to Invest
Variable
Constant
Female×GST

Male×GST

Male×GAT

Round
L.L.F

10

Coefficient
(t-stat)
Marginal value
0.755*
(5.49)
-0.710*
(2.02)
-0.281
-.0267
(0.77)
-0.105
-.0322
(0.95)
-0.128
-0.035
(0.86)
-0.014
-93.8

Out of 140 decisions, 82 were made by male leaders (43 in the GST and 39 in the GAT), and 58 by females (36 in
the GST and 22 in the GAT). The difference in the number of decisions made by men and women reflects the
slightly greater number of male subjects and the random assignments which were determined prior to the experiment
by ID number. The ID numbers were randomly allocated to subjects.
11
The model was originally estimated with random effects. Estimated rho was either less than 0.001 or insignificant.
Probit results are reported.
12
Footnote 7 applies.

Our interpretation is that female leaders expect less cooperation from their followers in
the GST, where their gender is revealed, than they do in the GAT, where their gender remains
unknown. Female leaders, therefore, become less eager to send a costly signal in the GST, in
Scenario 2, where followers’ refusal to follow significantly jeopardizes their payoff. This
behavior is not observed in Scenario 1, where followers’ refusal to follow the leader does not
harm her as much as it does in Scenario 2. In Scenario 2 (Scenario 1), the investing leader loses
$1 (earns $3) if 1 follower refuses to invest and loses $5 (loses $3) if they both do.
Our results seem similar to the “Stereotype Threat” in psychology (Steel, 1997). The
theme of this literature is that individuals who are targets of negative ability stereotypes
(females, African Americans, Latinos, etc) are at risk of doing poorly on tests of ability for
reasons such as self-doubt (the literature is mostly focused on verbal, mathematical, and
analytical tests, while our study focuses on leadership).
The significant difference in the behavior of our female leaders could also be a reaction
to similar social devaluations. In our case, however, the reaction of female leaders may be
affected more by their pessimism about the reaction of their followers rather than self-doubt.
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